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E.E.O.C. v. ABERCROMBIE & FITCH STORES, INC.1—
REEXAMINING THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT IN 






J.L. Yranski Nasuti, MDiv, JD, LLM* 
 
 
     In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed a 
number of cases involving religious claims arising out of the 
employment relationship.  The Court’s unanimous decision in 
the case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
E.E.O.C.2  recognized a ministerial exception that allowed a 
religious organization to avoid liability for the violation of an 
employee’s statutory workplace rights if the employee in 
question was a “ministerial employee.”  The more contentious 
5-4 decision in the case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby3 affirmed 
an employer’s claim that government regulations, which 
required employers (including for-profit corporations opposed 
to the use of contraceptives for religious reasons) to provide 
no-cost access to contraception on the grounds, were invalid 
since they violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.4  
More recently, the Court, in the case of E.E.O.C. v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., considered the question of whether 
a job applicant’s Title VII religious discrimination claim could 
prevail even though the applicant had never informed the 
employer that she needed a religious accommodation.    
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As in Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby, the party asserting the 
religious claim prevailed.  But, in this case that party was the 
employee. 
 
I.  FACTS 
 
     Samantha Elauf was seventeen years old when she applied 
for a sales job at an Abercrombie store in the Woodland Hills 
Mall in Tulsa, Oklahoma.5 Elauf had purchased Abercrombie 
clothes in the past and was familiar with the clothing brand.  
Abercrombie, which self-identifies its brand as one that 
“exemplifies a classic East Coast collegiate style of clothing,”6 
was so committed to its image that it required all of its 
employees to adhere to a “Look Policy.”   Under the “Look 
Policy,” employees were required to wear clothes that were, at 
the very least, similar to those sold in the stores. The policy 
also prohibited employees from wearing either black clothing 
or caps.  Any employee who failed to comply with the “Look 
Policy” would be subject to “disciplinary action . . . up to and 
including termination.”7    
 
     At the time, Elauf applied for the job, Abercrombie’s 
marketing strategy was somewhat unique in that it did not rely 
on advertising through traditional media outlets such as print 
publications and television.  It chose instead to create a 
“holistically brand-based, sensory experience” for its target 
customers when they entered an Abercrombie store.8  It was 
considered crucial to this strategy that the sales-floor 
employees be more than just people who rang up purchases.   
Abercrombie consistently referred to its sales staff as “models” 
and expected them to project the Abercrombie experience for 
its customers.  It was Abercrombie’s belief that a “model” who 
violated the “Look” fail[ed] to perform an essential function of 
the position, and ultimately damage[d] the brand.”9 
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     When Elauf interviewed for the job, she was wearing 
clothes that were consistent with the Abercrombie image . . . 
except for the fact that she was also wearing a hijab.10  (Elauf 
considered herself to be a Muslim and, since the age of 13, had 
followed the example of her mother and worn a headscarf 
whenever in public or in the presence of male strangers.11)   
Although Elauf was unaware of the “Look Policy” when she 
applied for the job, she did approach her friend, Farisa 
Sepahvand, an Abercrombie employee, to find out whether 
wearing a black headscarf would present a problem.  
Sephavand, who did not herself wear a headscarf, discussed the 
matter with Kalen McJilton, an assistant manager at the store 
who was acquainted with Elauf.  McJilton told Sephavand that 
he thought Elauf could wear a headscarf so long as it was not 
black.  (Abercrombie models were required to wear clothing 
similar to those sold by Abercrombie and Abercrombie did not 
sell black clothing.)12 
 
     Elauf applied for the job and was interviewed by Healther 
Cooke, the assistant manager in charge of recruiting, 
interviewing and hiring new employees.  Cooke, following 
Abercrombie’s official interview guide, evaluated Elauf in 
three categories:  “appearance & sense of style,” whether the 
applicant is “outgoing & promotes diversity,” and whether the 
applicant has “sophistication & aspiration.”13  According to the 
interview guide each candidate had to be rated on a 1-3 scale in 
each category.  In order to qualify for a position as a model, a 
candidate had to receive a score of two or more in appearance 
and a total score of more than five.  Elauf received a score of 
two in each category, which according to the “Model Group 
Interview Guide” meant that she had met company’s 
expectations and amounted to a recommendation that she be 
hired.   
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     During the interview, Cooke never mentioned the “Look 
Policy” by name to Elauf.  She did, however, explain some of 
the dress requirements including the requirements that the 
models had to wear clothes similar to those sold by 
Abercrombie and that they were not to wear heavy make-up or 
nail polish.  Elauf, in turn, never told Cooke that she was a 
Muslim, never brought up the topic of the headscarf, never 
indicated that she wore the headscarf for religious reasons, and 
never asked for a religious accommodation.14  Later on Cooke 
would admit in a deposition that she while she “did not know” 
Elauf’s religion, she had “assumed that she was Muslim” and 
“figured that was the religious reason why she wore her head 
scarf.”15  
 
     Cooke had the authority to make hiring decisions for the 
store in the Woodland Hills Mall without seeking the approval 
of anyone else at Abercrombie.   In this particular case, she 
decided to first check with her store manager before making 
the job offer to Elauf since she was not sure if Elauf’s 
headscarf would conflict with the company’s “Look Policy.”    
When the manager was unable to give her a definitive answer, 
she contacted the Randall Johnson, the district manager, who 
told her not to hire Elauf.  In a deposition, Cooke testified that 
she told Johnson that she thought Elauf was a very good 
candidate.  She also alleged that when she told Johnson that 
Elauf wore a headscarf for what she believed were religious 
reasons, he responded by saying “”You still can’t hire her 
because someone can come in and paint themselves green and 
say they were doing it for religious reasons and we can’t hire 
him.””16  Cooke further claimed that she had informed Johnson 
that she thought Elauf was a Muslim, a recognized religion, 
that she wore the headscarf for religious reasons, and, that they 
should hire Elauf.  According to Cooke, Johnson continued to 
instruct her not to extend a job offer.17    
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     Johnson would subsequently deny that he had been told that 
Cooke thought Elauf wore the headscarf for religious reasons 
or that he had made the remark about people painting 
themselves green.18   He testified that if there had been any 
question about whether a hijab constituted a prohibited cap, he 
would have contacted the Human Resources Department for 
clarification. 19  But, he did state that he thought the wearing of 
a hijab would violate the “Look Policy” and that “there was no 
difference between a yarmulke, head scarf, “[o]r a ball cap or a 
helmet for all that matters.  It’s still a cap,” and if an applicant 
asked to wear a ball cap for religious reasons, he “[s]till would 
have denied them, yes, sir.””20 
 
     After her conversation with Johnson, and as per his 
instructions, Cooke redid her original written evaluation of 
Elauf and downgraded the “appearance and sense of style” 
score to a 1—which lowered the overall score to a 5.21  The 
altered score disqualified Elauf for a position at Abercrombie.  
Elauf only found out that she would not be hired when her 
friend, Sepahvand, told her that the district manager had 
instructed Cooke not to offer her a position because of her 
headscarf. 
 
II.  LOWER COURT DECISIONS 
 
A.  U.S. District Court 
 
     The E.E.O.C filed a lawsuit on behalf of Elauf and against 
Abercrombie & Fitch, in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging religious 
discrimination based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C.  § 2000e-5(f)(1) & (3) and Title I of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 1981a).   Both parties filed 
Motions for Summary Judgment.  The E.E.O.C.’s motion was 
based “on the issue of liability or, in the alternative, on one or 
107 / Vol 36 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
 
more elements of its prima facie case and/or on Abercrombie’s 
affirmative defense of undue hardship,” and Abercrombie’s 
was based on the assertion that “the E.E.O.C.  ha[d] not 
established a prima facie case, and because an accommodation 
for Elauf would cause Abercrombie undue hardship.”22  
     The District Court began its analysis by making three 
observations about religious discrimination claims.  The first 
was that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) only applied to those aspects of 
religious observance and practice of the employee or 
prospective that an employer was able to reasonably 
accommodate without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business.  The second was to indicate that the 
applicable burden-shifting approach for this kind of case was 
that of McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green.23  And, the third 
was to show how the Tenth Circuit had applied that burden-
shifting approach in the case of Thomas v. National Ass’n of 
Letter Carrier. 24    In Thomas, the plaintiff had the initial 
burden of showing that:  1.  the plaintiff had a bona fide 
religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; 
2.  the plaintiff had informed the employer of this belief; and 3.  
the plaintiff had not been hired because he or she failed to 
comply with the employment requirement.25   The burden then 
shifted to the defendant to: 1.  conclusively rebut one or more 
elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case; 2.  show that it had 
offered a reasonably accommodation, or 3.  show that it was 
unable to accommodate the employee’s religious needs 
reasonably without undue hardship.26  The Tenth Circuit, in 
Thomas, also noted that there was a significant difference in 
the burden shifting approach for disability and religious 
discrimination cases as opposed to other types of 
discrimination cases: 
 
In [an ADA or religious failure to 
accommodate] case, the Congress has already 
determined that a failure to offer a reasonable 
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accommodation to an otherwise qualified 
disabled employee is unlawful discrimination.  
Thus, we use the burden-shifting mechanism, 
not to probe the subjective intent of the 
employer, but rather simply to provide a useful 
structure by which the district court, when 
considering a motion for summary judgment, 
can determine whether the various parties have 
advanced sufficient evidence to meet their 
respective traditional burdens to prove or 
disprove the reasonableness of the 
accommodations offered or not offered.27 
 
     The District Court had no problem concluding that the 
plaintiff met the requirements, articulated in both McDonald 
Douglas and Thomas, for establishing a prima facie case.  
There was evidence that Elauf wore the headscarf based on her 
understanding of the Koran.  The Abercrombie “Look Policy” 
prohibited the wearing of head coverings.  Abercrombie had 
notice that the reason Elauf wore the headscarf was because of 
a religious belief.  Finally the defendant did not hire the 
plaintiff because to wear a headscarf would be in violation of 
the “Look Policy.”28  
 
     The defendant’s rebuttal of the plaintiff’s prima facie case 
had centered on two issues.  The first was whether the wearing 
of a headscarf was based on a bona fide religious belief and 
whether Elauf, in fact, wore her hijab for a religious reason.  
The second was whether the notice requirement had been met.  
In response to the first claim, the District Court cited three U.S. 
Supreme Court cases.  In 1953, the Supreme Court had held 
that “it is no business of the courts to say . . . what is a religious 
practice or activity.”29  Twelve year later, the Supreme Court 
held that an action was a “bone fide religious belief” if it was 
religious within the plaintiff’s own scheme of things and was 
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sincerely held.30  Thus, the individual’s assertion “that [her] 
belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given 
great weight.”31   The most recent of the cited cases went even 
further and held that if a person’s beliefs were religiously 
based, it was not for the court to question whether those beliefs 
were “derived from revelation, study, upbringing, gradual 
evolution, or some source that appears entirely 
incomprehensible.”32   
 
     It was Abercrombie’s claim that women wore hijabs for a 
variety of non-religious reasons, including cultural and 
nationalistic ones.  The defendant also asserted that the Quran 
did not explicitly require Islamic women to wear headscarves.   
In response to the first assertion, the court noted that there was 
nothing in the record to indicate that Elauf’s decision to begin 
wearing the hijab when she was thirteen was based on any 
reason other than her religious beliefs.  As for the fact that the 
Quran does not require women to wear head coverings, the 
district court, citing a Seventh Circuit case,  
 
 [N]ote[d] that to restrict [Title VII claims] to 
those practices which are mandated or 
prohibited by a tenet of religion, would involve 
the court in determining not only what are the 
tenets of a particular religion, which by itself 
perhaps would not be beyond the province of 
the court, but would frequently require the 
courts to decide whether a particular practice is 
or is not required by the tenets of the religion.  
We find such a judicial determination to be 
irreconcilable with the warning issued by the 
Supreme Court. 33 
 
The District Court concluded that even though Elauf did not 
consider Muslim women to be bad Muslims if they did not 
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wear hijabs, she wore the hijab based on the Quran’s teaching 
that women should be modest.  As such, her wearing of the 
hijab was based on a religious belief. 
 
     The District Court also dismissed Abercrombie’s challenge 
to the sincerity of Elauf’s religious belief based on the fact that 
she did not know the street address of her mosque, did not 
regularly attend Friday services, and did not prayer five times a 
day every day.  In this matter, the court agreed with the Second 
Court of Appeals that “it was appropriate, indeed necessary, for 
a court to engage in an analysis of the sincerity—as opposed to 
the verity—of someone’s religious beliefs in . . . the Title VII 
context.”34   It was legitimate to do a sincerity analysis “to 
differentiat[e] between beliefs that are held as a matter of 
conscience and those that are animated by motives of deception 
and fraud.”35  The District Court limited its sincerity inquiry to 
the question of whether Elauf believed that she was required to 
wear the headscarf and not to whether she followed all of the 
tenets of the Islamic faith.  The only accommodation in this 
case involved the wearing of a headscarf.  And, the issue was 
whether Elauf’s motivation was a matter of conscience or a 
matter of deception and fraud.  The District Court rejected 
Abercrombie’s argument that Elauf’s sincerity was an issue of 
credibility—and a matter properly decided by a trier of fact—
and concluded that there was nothing in the record to dispute 
the fact that she wore the headscarf based on a bone fide 
religious belief. 
 
     Abercrombie’s more interesting argument involved the 
issue of whether, under the Civil Rights Act, the company 
could be liable for failing to reasonably accommodate Elauf if 
she had not explicitly notified the company that she needed a 
religious accommodation to wear the headscarf.  While the 
Courts of Appeal in the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
had ruled that the notice requirement could be satisfied if “the 
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employer has enough information to make it aware there exits a 
conflict between the individual’s religious practice or belief 
and a requirement for applying for or performing a job,”36 the 
Tenth Circuit had not addressed this particular matter.   The 
Tenth Circuit had, however, acknowledged that notice was 
essential to the interactive process leading to accommodation37 
and that it was the employee who ordinarily provided the 
employer with notice of a need for an accommodation.38 The 
District Court concluded, “since the purpose of the notice 
requirement was to facilitate the interactive process and 
prevent ambush of an unwitting employer . . . it was enough 
that the employer has notice an accommodation is needed.”39  
Abercrombie did not need to receive an explicit request from 
Elauf.  In this instance, the fact, that Elauf wore her headscarf 
to the interview and the assistant store manager who 
interviewed her knew that the headscarf was worn for religious 
reasons, meant that Abercrombie could not rebut the second 
element of the prima facie case.  Abercrombie had notice that 
Elauf wore a headscarf based on her religious belief. 
 
     Abercrombie’s final argument was that even if it did not 
rebut the prima facie case, it should still prevail on the grounds 
that it would be an “undue hardship” for the retail firm to 
accommodate Elauf.  Noting that an “undue hardship” 
constitutes something “more than a de minimus cost”40 and that 
the proffered hardship must be actual and not the result of mere 
speculation,41 the District Court concluded that Abercrombie’s 
unsubstantiated claim that allowing Elauf to wear a headscarf 
would have a negative impact on the brand, sales and 
compliance failed to meet the burden of establishing an undue 
hardship and denied Abercrombie’s motion for summary 
judgment.  The E.E.O.C.’s motion for a partial summary 
judgment was granted and the case went to trial to determine 
the issue of damages.  The jury awarded $20,000 in damages 
but denied prospective injunctive relief.  
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B.  U.S. Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) 
 
     In its appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Abercrombie argued that 
allowing Elauf to wear a headscarf would create an undue 
hardship for the company and require an accommodation that 
was not based on a sincerely held religious belief.  In addition, 
and, more importantly, the appellant claimed that the company 
should not be liable for failing to make an accommodation 
since Elauf had not properly notified Abercrombie that she 
wore the headscarf for religious reasons and that she needed a 
religious accommodation.  In its de novo review of the record, 
the appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of 
Abercrombie’s motion for summary judgment, reversed the 
granting of the E.E.O.C.’s motion for a summary judgment, 
and remanded the case to the district court instructing it to 
vacate its judgment and enter one in favor of Abercrombie.  
 
     The Circuit Court began by examining the meaning of the 
term “religion” as it is understood in the context of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act.  According to the E.E.O.C. Compliance 
Manual, religion is broadly defined under Title VII and it 
“includes not only traditional organized religions such as 
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, but also 
religious beliefs that are new, uncommon, not part of a formal 
church or sect, only subscribed to by a small number of people, 
or that seem unreasonable to others.”42  But, the Compliance 
Manual also recognizes that “[w]hether a practice is religious 
depends on the employee’s motivation.  The same practice 
might be engaged in by one person for religious reasons and by 
another person for purely secular reasons.”43  The Circuit Court 
identified two significant implications stemming from the 
E.E.O.C.’s general principles for the enforcement of Title VII 
proscriptions against religious discrimination.  The first was 
that it was possible for an applicant or employee to engage in a 
practice that was associated with a particular religion, but to do 
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so for cultural or other reasons that were not religious.44  The 
second was that unless a person’s conduct is based on religious 
beliefs that have “a distinctive content related to ultimate ideas 
about life, purpose, and death,”45 that conduct is outside of the 
“protective ambit” of Title VII.  
 
     The Circuit Court went on to explain that in order to 
successfully make a claim for a religious accommodation, there 
must be a true conflict between the employee’s religious 
practice and the employer’s neutral policy.  The employee must 
consider the religious practice in question to be inflexible and 
required by his or her religion.46  On the other hand, there is no 
actual conflict, and therefore no need for an accommodation, if 
the employee neither feels obliged to adhere to the practice nor 
considers it to be an inflexible practice.    
 
     The appellate court held that the discussion about whether 
an employee has a religious belief or practice that must to be 
accommodated was one that needed to be initiated by the 
employee and not the employer.  It cited the E.E.O.C. 
publication, Best Practices for Eradicating Religious 
Discrimination in the Workplace, which cautioned that the 
employer should “avoid assumptions or stereotypes about what 
constitutes a religious belief or practice or what type of 
accommodation is appropriate.”47   This would include insuring 
that its managers and employees were trained not to make 
stereotypical assumptions based on a person’s religious dress 
and grooming practices.  It was only after the employee puts 
the employer on notice of a religious conflict that the employer 
may ask for additional information to determine whether an 
accommodation was necessary and available.48        
  
     The Tenth Circuit used its own modified version of the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach for religious 
accommodation cases as it had set forth in Thomas v. National 
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Ass’n of Letter Carriers. 49   That test was the same one 
presented by the District Court.  (In order to establish a prima 
facie case the employee had to show that he or she had a 
religious belief that conflicted with an employment 
requirement; that the employee informed the employer of that 
belief; and that the employer either failed to hire or fired the 
employee because of the employee’s failure to comply with an 
employment requirement.)  The appellate court, however, 
focused on the second element of the employee’s prima facie 
case and concluded that Elauf had not informed her employer 
directly of a particular religious need to wear a headscarf.  The 
E.E.O.C. had tried to argue that there were additional 
permissible ways for an employer to be put on notice that the 
employee had a particular religious belief.  The court, however, 
found that even if an employer had some notice that a religious 
belief existed, the employer would still lack knowledge as to 
whether the employee considered the religious practice to be 
inflexible and in conflict with an employment requirement, 
and, therefore, in need of a reasonable accommodation.50  In 
this case, “there is no genuine dispute of material fact that no 
Abercrombie agent responsible for, or involved in, the hiring 
process had such actual knowledge—from any source—that 
Ms. Elauf’s practice of wearing a hijab stemmed from her 
religious beliefs and that she needed an accommodation for 
it.”51  The Court of Appeals concluded that most that could be 
said was that the person who conducted the interview assumed 
that Elauf “wore her hijab for religious reasons and felt 
religiously obliged to do so—thus creating a conflict with 
Abercrombie’s clothing policy.” 52   The assistant manager’s 
subsequent call to the regional manager to find out if wearing a 
hijab for religious reasons would violate the “Look Policy” was 
also derived from assumptions about Elauf and not on any 
actual knowledge that an accommodation would be necessary.    
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     Much of the Circuit Court’s rationale for reversing the 
lower court’s decision was based on its conclusion that an 
employer was only permitted to engage in an interactive 
religion-accommodation discussion with the employee after the 
employer had actual knowledge that the employee had a 
sincere religious belief and that that belief required the 
employee to follow a religious practice that was in conflict 
with the employment requirements. 53   One of the court’s 
concerns was that if the employer initiated a conversation with 
an applicant or employee about possible religious beliefs 
(without the topic being brought up by the 
applicant/employee), it could be viewed as non-job related 
inquiry and, therefore, in violation of the Civil Rights Act.  
Another concern was that in religious accommodation cases, 
the employee needed to establish that the actual motivation for 
following a particular practice was, in fact, of a religious 
nature.  While some people might follow a practice for 
religious reasons, that does not mean that everyone following 
that practice is similarly motivated.  “A person’s religion is not 
like his sex or race—obvious at a glance.  Even if [the person] 
wears a religious symbol, such as a cross or a yarmulke, this 
may not pinpoint [that person’s] particular beliefs and 
observances.”54  An employer need not be familiar with all 
traditionally religious practices and should not be required to 
speculate on whether an employee follows such a practice for a 
religious reason.  “Religion is a uniquely personal and 
individual matter.”55  It is the duty of the employee to give the 
employer fair warning of employment practices that interfere 
with his or her religion . . . and, in addition, to inform the 
employer that the employee considers the religious practice to 
be inflexible and in need of a reasonable accommodation by 
the employer. 
 
     According to the Tenth Circuit, the employee’s affirmative 
obligation to inform the employer of a need for a religious 
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accommodation is met when the employee or applicant 
“provide[s] enough information to make the employer aware 
that there exists a conflict between the individual’s religious 
practice or belief and a requirement for applying for or 
performing the job.” 56   The court saw no justification for 
granting deference to the E.E.O.C.’s contention that the plain 
language in its manual could be disregarded when the 
employer had notice of a religious belief and the need for a 
religious accommodation from a source that did not involve an 
explicit communication from the employee.  It concluded 
instead that under a natural reading of the regulation in 
question, “the employer’s obligation to provide a reasonable 
religious accommodation would be triggered only when 
applicants or employees explicitly informed the employer of 
their conflicting religious practice and need for an 
accommodation.”57 
      
     In a separate opinion that concurred in part and dissented in 
part, Justice Ebel stated that while the trial court should not 
have granted the E.E.O.C.’s motion for summary judgment, it 
also should have left it for a jury to decide whether 
Abercrombie was liable for religious discrimination.   His 
opinion was based on three conclusions.  The first was that the 
majority’s second requirement for establishing a prima facie 
case (which required showing that Elauf had informed the 
employer that its “Look Policy” conflicted with her religious 
beliefs) was inflexible and made no sense under the law and 
the circumstances of the case. 58   The second was that the 
plaintiff had, in fact, established a prima facie claim that 
Abercrombie had failed to reasonably accommodate Elauf’s 
religious practice.59  And, finally, summary judgment in favor 
of either party was inappropriate since Abercrombie’s evidence 
contradicted the prima facie evidence and created a triable 
issue of fact whether the defendant had failed to accommodate 
the plaintiff’s religious practice of wearing a headscarf.60 
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C.  U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION 
 
1.  Majority Opinion 
 
     The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tenth 
Circuit and remanded the case for further consideration.  The 
majority opinion was delivered by Justice Scalia and joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayer, and Kagan.  Justice Alito filed a separate 
concurring opinion and Justice Thomas filed an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.   
 
     The majority decision focused on one issue--whether an 
applicant’s Title VII disparate treatment claim, which was 
based on an employer’s refusal to hire the applicant in order to 
avoid having to make a reasonable accommodation for a 
religious practice, could succeed if the applicant had failed to 
inform the employer of the need for an accommodation.61  The 
majority opinion rejected Abercrombie’s claim that the 
employer had to have “actual knowledge” of the applicant’s 
need for an accommodation and focused instead on whether the 
employee’s need for an accommodation was a motivating 
factor behind the employer’s refusal to hire the applicant.    
 
     Not surprisingly, Scalia began the opinion with a textual 
analysis of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  For the purposes 
of the statute, “religion” “includ[ed] all aspects of religious 
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless the employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to” 
a “religious observance or practice without undue hardship on 
the conduct of the employer’s business.”62    In a disparate-
treatment claim, the plaintiff must be able to establish three 
things:  1. the employer “fail[ed] . . . to hire” the applicant; 2.  
“because of”; 3.  “such individual’s . . . religion” (including the 
applicant’s religious practice.)  In this case “Abercrombie (1) 
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failed to hire Elauf and since the parties concede that (if she 
sincerely believed that wearing a headscarf was required by her 
religion) Elauf’s wearing of a headscarf was (2) a “religious 
practice”, then the only issue to be decided was whether she 
was not hired (3) “because of” her religious practice.”63   
 
    The majority opinion noted that while many anti-
discrimination statutes include the phrase “because of,” they do 
not necessarily use it in the same way.  In most instances, the 
phrase can, minimally, be interchanged with the traditional 
standard of “but-for” causation.  That, however, is not what 
occurs in Title VII cases where the meaning of the phrase is 
relaxed to the extent that it would prohibit allowing a protected 
characteristic to be a “motivating” factor in an employment 
decision. 64   As such, the Court concluded that the use of 
“because of” in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) “links the forbidden 
consideration to each of the verbs preceding it; an individual’s 
actual religion practice may not be a motivating factor in 
failing to hire, in refusing to hire, and so on.”65   
 
     The Court specifically differentiated Title VII cases from 
cases brought under the Americans with Disability Act of 1990 
(ADA). 66   Under the ADA, the requirement to make 
“reasonable accommodations” only applies when the employer 
has actual knowledge of the applicant’s physical or mental 
limitations.67  A similar knowledge requirement is missing for 
Title VII cases.  Under Title VII, knowledge and motivation 
are considered to be separate concepts.  In a disparate treatment 
case, actions taken by an employer may result in liability when 
they are based on the employer’s motives regardless of what 
the employer actually knows about the applicant.  
Consequently, an employer would be liable if the motive for 
not hiring an applicant is to avoid making a reasonable 
accommodation—even if that action is based on nothing more 
than an “unsubstantiated suspicion” that an accommodation 
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would be needed.   Conversely, an employer who had actual 
knowledge of the need for an accommodation would not be 
liable if the reason for not hiring the applicant was not 
motivated by a desire to avoid accommodation.68   
 
    The Supreme Court announced a straightforward rule for 
disparate-treatment cases.  “An employer may not make an 
applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor 
in employment decisions.”69  This was different from the rule 
followed in the Tenth Circuit that placed the burden on the 
applicant to inform the employer that there was a religious 
conflict between the religious practice and the job 
requirements.  Scalia characterized that rule as the product of a 
flawed statutory interpretation.   The lower court had simply 
added words to the law in order to get a desired result.  
Although Congress could have included the requirement in the 
statute, it decided not to do so.   It chose instead to prohibit 
actions “taken with the motive of avoiding the need for 
accommodating a religious practice.” 70   (In dictum, the 
Supreme Court noted that it would leave for future 
consideration the issue of whether the applicant must show that 
the employer, at the very least, suspected that the practice in 
question was a religious practice in order for the motive 
requirement to be met.  The Court was not required to consider 
it in this instance, since Abercrombie knew, or at least 
suspected, that the practice was religious.) 
 
     The majority opinion concluded with a rejection of 
Abercrombie’s claim that the case was inaccurately argued as a 
disparate-treatment case rather than a disparate-impact claim.  
The Court presented two reasons for its conclusion.  The first 
was based on the fact that the definition of religion in Title VII 
included “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as 
well as belief.” 71   Since a religious practice is a protected 
characteristic under the statute, discrimination based on that 
2017 / E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch / 120 
 
 
practice would in fact raise a valid disparate treatment claim.  
The second reason was that the Court rejected the employer’s 
claim that disparate-treatment can only apply to cases where 
the employer’s policies treat religious practices less favorably 
than similar secular practices.  A neutral policy might result in 
intentional discrimination.  But, that is not enough.  Under 
Title VII religious practices are given “favored treatment, 
affirmatively obligating employers not “to fail or refuse to hire 
or discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s” 
“religious observance and practice.””72  Abercrombie’s policy 
prohibiting headgear was otherwise neutral with regard to all 
employees.  However, without an accommodation, the 
otherwise-neutral policy discriminated against Elauf because of 
her religion. 
 
2.  Concurring Opinion 
 
     Justice Alito’s concurring opinion agreed that Title VII did 
not impose the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the notice 
requirement on the applicant.  He did, however, assert that 
Title VII provided for a knowledge requirement by the 
employer.  It seemed obvious to Alito that “an employer cannot 
be held liable for taking an adverse action because of an 
employee’s religious practice unless the employer knows that 
the employee engages in the practice for a religious reason.”73  
Alito’s concern with the majority’s approach was that an 
unknowing employer could be held liable for not hiring an 
applicant even though the employer honestly thought that the 
applicant wore the scarf for secular reasons and did not know 
the applicant was a Muslim.  He suggested that it was “entirely 
reasonable to understand the prohibition against an employer’s 
taking an adverse action because of a religious practice to mean 
that an employer may not take an adverse action because of a 
practice that the employer knows to be religious.”74  Intentional 
discrimination is “blameworthy conduct” for which an 
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employer should be held liable only when there is a knowledge 
requirement.    Alito’s concern was that an employer would not 
even know to begin to consider accommodating a practice if 
there was no knowledge that the practice was of a religious 
nature.   
 
     Alito concluded by taking exception with the majority’s 
assertion that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the 
employer failed to accommodate the religious practice.75  He 
argued instead that Title VII specifically states “it shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or 
refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of [any aspect of] 
such individual’s . . . religious . . . practice . . . unless an 
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably 
accommodate to [the] employee’s or prospective employee’s 
religious . . . practice . . . without undue hardship on the 
conduct of the employer’s business.” 76  (Emphasis added by 
Alito.)  While he concedes that the burden is on the plaintiff to 
prove that the employer failed to or refused to hire the 
employee because of a religious practice, he also argues that 
the burden of proof is on the employer to demonstrate that it 
was unreasonable to accommodate the employee’s religious 
practice without undue hardship. 
 
 
3.  Opinion Dissenting in Part and Concurring in Part 
 
     Justice Thomas concurred with the majority only to the 
extent that he agreed that there were two causes of action under 
Title VII—a disparate treatment claim and a disparate impact 
claim.  His far more serious disagreement with the majority 
rested on his belief that the Abercrombie case was, in fact, a 
disparate impact case.   
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     According to Thomas, intentional discrimination required 
the employer to treat a person less favorably than others 
because of a protected trait.77  Disparate-impact discrimination, 
on the only hand, “involve[d] employment practices that are 
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in 
fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be 
justified by business necessity.” 78   It followed then that 
Abercrombie did not engage in “intentional discrimination” 
since it had a neutral dress code policy that did not treat 
religious practices less favorably than similar secular practices.  
Absent an accommodation, on the other hand, its policy would 
fall more harshly on someone who wore headscarves as a 
religious practice.  
 
     Thomas’ problem with the majority opinion was that he 
thought it ignored the relevant statutory text and twisted the 
meaning of “intentional treatment” to include refusing to give a 
religious applicant “favored treatment.”79  Thomas contended 
that inserting the Title VII definition of religion80 onto Title 
VII’s specific charge that it is illegal “to fail or refuse to hire . . 
. any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion”81 
did not resolve the question of whether Elauf had been rejected 
“because of her religious beliefs.”   Thomas identified two 
possible ways of applying the “because of one’s religion” 
provision in disparate treatment cases.  One would make it 
illegal to base an employment decision on the religious nature 
of the particular practice of the employee.  The other would 
make it illegal to make an employment decision based on the 
fact that the employee’s practice happens to be religious.82   
The problem with the second approach is that it would make 
the employer liable even though the employer had no 
discriminatory motive.   For Thomas this would result in a 
strict liability situation that would preclude the employer from 
asserting a defense that the employer had no idea that the 
particular practice was, in fact, religious.83  
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     While Thomas did not accuse the majority of creating a 
strict liability option for cases alleging intentional religious 
discrimination, he did contend that the Court had opted for a 
compromise that would punish employers “who refuse to 
accommodate applicants under neutral policies when they act 
“with the motive of avoiding accommodation.””84  As a result, 
the employer in a religious discrimination case based on 
disparate treatment case might have to demonstrate that his or 
her actions constituted something more than equal treatment.85   
Thomas applauded the majority for “put[ting] to rest the notion 
that Title VII creates a freestanding religious-accommodation 
claim”  but  disagreed with the Court’s “creat[ion] in its stead 
[of] an entirely new form of liability:  the disparate-treatment-
based-on-equal-treatment claim.”86 
         
      
D.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
     During oral arguments, Justice Alito presented a 
hypothetical to the attorney for Abercrombie & Fitch.  Four 
people show up for a job interview.  One is a Sikh man wearing 
a turban.  The second is a Hasidic man wearing a hat.  The 
third is an Islamic woman wearing a hijab.  And, the fourth is a 
Catholic nun wearing a habit.  Would the applicants have an 
affirmative obligation to explain to the employer that they 
dressed the way they did for religious reasons?  And, if they 
did not provide that information to the employer, would the 
employer (assuming that the applicants might need some kind 
of a religious accommodation) be liable under Title VII for 
refusing to hire them in order to avoid possible accommodation 
issues?  
 
     The Tenth Circuit clearly thought that a job applicant had an 
affirmative obligation to inform a prospective employer that 
there was a need for a reasonable accommodation based on 
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religious beliefs.  If the applicant failed to give that information 
to the employer, the employer would not have an obligation to 
even raise the issue of reasonable accommodations.  Under the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, an applicant could claim disparate 
treatment even though the applicant failed to provide the 
employer with actual knowledge of the need for a reasonable 
accommodation.  The only thing that the applicant would have 
to prove is that the employer’s assumption or suspicion of a 
possible need to accommodate was the motivating factor in 
denying employment.   The Court suggested, at least in oral 
arguments, that the best practice in situations where the 
employer has reason to believe that a particular applicant might 
need a reasonable accommodation would be for the employer 
to inform the applicant of all the job requirements and then to 
ask if the applicant would have any problem complying with 
them.  In the Abercrombie case, the person who conducted the 
interview suspected that Elauf wore the headscarf for religious 
reasons.  And, even though she told Elauf some of the 
particulars about “The Look” policy, she never mentioned that 
Abercrombie models were prohibited from wearing caps or 
black clothing.  As far as the applicant was concerned, there 
was no reason to ask for a religious accommodation.  What the 
assistant manager should have done instead was to inform 
Elauf all of the particulars of “The Look” policy (including the 
prohibition regarding caps) and then to have asked whether she 
would have any problem complying with the policy.87  If Elauf 
had said that she had no problems with the requirements, then 
the employer would have had no obligation to enter into a 
discussion about a religious accommodation.  If, on the other 
hand, Elauf had informed the interviewer that she had a 
problem because she wore her headscarf for religious reasons, 
she would have put the employer on notice that there was a 
need for an accommodation. 
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      In this particular case, the Supreme Court never had to 
address the question of whether it was possible for 
Abercrombie to reasonably accommodate Elauf’s need to wear 
a hijab.  The legal issue was not whether the employer had 
refused the applicant’s request for a reasonable 
accommodation.  It was simply whether the employer’s 
suspicions that the applicant might need a religious 
accommodation constituted sufficient notice to meet the second 
prong of employee’s burden of proof in a disparate treatment 
case.  The Abercrombie case affirmed that an applicant could 
prevail, even though the applicant had not informed the 
employer of the need for a religious accommodation, if the 
applicant can show that the motivating factor in the employer’s 
decision not to hire the person was the possibility of having to 
make a religious accommodation.  When Justice Scalia 
announced the Court’s decision from the bench, he indicated 
that it was an easy decision.  “Title VII forbids adverse 
employment decisions made with a forbidden motive whether 
this motive derives from actual knowledge, a well-founded 
suspicion or merely a hunch.”88   
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